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ABTRACT
This paper reviews, from an applied forecasting perspective, the
properties of short— and long—term interest rates in an efficient market.
The paper emphasizes that efficient markets do not preclude economicagents
from successfully forecasting movements in short—term interest rates. For
brief forecast intervals, however, ex ante changes in long—term ratesare
sufficiently close to zero that economic agents are not likely to improve
upon the no—change prediction of the martingale model. Economic agents, in
effect, are not likely to succeed in forecasting short—term movements in
long—term interest rates. An analysis of three sets of Canadian interest
rate forecasts provides results which are consistent with the theoretical
discussior, Further, these results parallel those obtained in recent
studies of recorded forecasts in the United States, although the authors of
these latter studies apparently failed to appreciate the nature of their
findings.
James E. Pesando
Institute for Policy Analysis




In view of the substantial empirical evidence which supports the
proposition that capital markets are efficient in their use of publicly
available information, surprisingly little attention has been directed to
the question of whether economic agents can successfully forecast interest
rate movements. Impressed perhaps by the early evidence in favour of
the random walk hypothesis,1 most sophisticated agents tend to regard
published forecasts of the future level of aggregate stock prices with
a healthy degree of skepticism. As yet, however, such skepticism does not
appear to extend to published forecasts of movements in either short— or
long—term rates of interest, nor is it clear to many whether or not such
skepticism is warranted.
At the theoretical level, the question of whether economic agents
can successfully anticipate interest rate movements in an efficient mar-
ket has received increased attention. Sargent (1976) and Pesando (1978)
have noted that long—term interest rates in an efficient market will
approximately follow a martingale sequence —andthus exhibit random walk
characteristics —inthe absence of time—varying term premiums. As Mishkin
(1978) and Pesando (1979) caution, however, there is nothing in efficient
markets theory which requires that short—term rates follow a random walk.
Thus agents without access to inside information may well succeed
in forecasting movements in short—term rates, but are not likely to
succeed in forecasting short—run movements in long—term rates if the term
premium accorded long—term bonds is indeed time—invariant.
The purpose of this paper is to extract from these theoretical
results an appropriate perspective on the practical problem of forecasting2
interest rate movements. The first section of the paper briefly reviews
the theoretical results, including the role of time—varying term premiums.
The second explores the closeness of the martingale approximation for long—
term rates in Canada, an exercise which bears directly on the usefulness
of the no—change prediction implied by the martingale model. The third
section examines the performance of a variety of recorded interest rate
forecasts in Canada in light of the preceding theoretical arguments. A
concluding section completes the paper.
2. THEORETICAL OVERVIEW
Let denote the interest rate on an n—period, non—coupon
bond in period t , the information available to the market in period t,
and the forward rate at time t for the one—period bond rate in
period t+i. If pure expectations govern the term structure, and if the
standard arithmetic approximation to the geometric average that links the
long—term rate to current and future short—term rates is satisfactory,
then —asnoted by Sargent (1976) and Pesando (1978) —theex ante change




The termonthe right—hand side of equation (1), which represents the non—
overlapping one—period rates, clearly approaches zero as n gets large.







Ifthis term premium is constant, then (2) reduces to (1) and hence the
martingale approximation emerges:
E(R,kt_l) R,t_
Equation(3) indicates that the ex ante change in the long—term rate is
approximately zero ifnis large, and hence that the optimal forecast
ofthe long—term rate is simply its current value. For a ten—year bond
whose (annual) yield is being forecast on a guarterly basis, n equals
40 and the tuartingale approximation is likely to be close so long as the
short—termrate is not "too nonstationary". If the yield on this same
bond is being forecast on a monthly basis, n equals 120 and the ex ante
changein the long—term rate will be even closer to zero. Ingeneral, the
shorterthe forecast interval, the closer the martingale approximation.
Equivalently, it is short—run movements in long—term rates which will not
be predictable under the joint hypothesis of market efficiency and a time—
invariant term premium.
For coupon bonds, as noted by Pesando (1979), the expression analogous
to (1) is more complicated. Nonetheless, as illustrated later in this
study, the martingale approximation remains quite close for short—term
movements in long—term rates in the absence of time—varying term premiums.4
Intuitively, the martingale approximation stems from the fact that over
the unit intervals (e.g. one quarter) in which agents typically forecast
interest rate movements, the percentage change in bond prices necessary
to equate the ex ante returns on short— and long—term securities (up to
a time—invariant term premium) is very small. As a result, the implied
exante changes in long—term rates are very close to zero. From this
perspective, the inartingale approximation for long—term rates is but a
specific illustration of the more general proposition that short—run
movements in speculative prices are not likely to be predictable.
Efficient market theory does not require, however, that the short—
term rate follow a martingale, nor does empirical evidence suggest that
this is the case. There is no arbitrage opportunity through which agents
could eliminate any serial dependence in the short—term rate and —as
emphasized by Modigliani and Shiller (1973) —anexpectations solution"
to the term structure is consistent with any stochastic representation
of the short—term rate. Using end—of—the quarter data on 90—day Treasury
bills and 90—day finance company paper, so as to eliminate possible biases
due to time aggregation (Working (1960)), alternative time series models
can be fitted to the Canadian data. For the sample period 1957:1 —1979:1,
an ARNA (1, 1) or an AR (2) representation is clearly superior to the mar—
tingale model for both short—term rates.2 The fact that the short—term
rate need not follow a inartingale sequence is "reconciled1' with the mar—
tingale property of the long—term rate when it is remembered that the
latter is only approximate. The long—term rate would exactly follow a5
martingaleif and only if the short—term rate followeda martingale. In
this case, the ex ante capital gain or losson long—term bonds would always
equal zero, and the long—term rate would simply equal the short—termrate
plus the time—invariant term premium.
The martingale approximation for the long—term rate is derivedon
the assumption that the term premium accorded long—term bondsis time—
invariant. Is the existence of time—varying term premiumslikely to
invalidate this approximation? The answer, ofcourse, is moot, although
a convincing case can be made that the "forecastability" of movements
in long—term rates is not likely to be salvaged in this fashion. Those
who work in the capital asset pricing framework of modern financetheory
tend to treat the term premium —whichis related to the covariance of
bond returns, and the return to the market portfolio —asconstant over
time.3 Many —ifnot most —ofthose who have conducted empirical studies
ofthe determinants of term premiums have concluded that theymay well
be time—invariant. McCulloch (1975) and Pesando (1975a) havepresented
evidence that the term premium accorded long—termgovernment bonds in
the United States and Canada, respectively,may be time—invariant. Mishkin
(1978)and Pesando (1978) have found empirical support for the jointhypo-
thesis that the bond market is efficient and term premiumsare time—
invariant. Attempts to enrich the traditional term structureequation of
Modigliani—Sutch (1967) or Modigliani—Shiller (1973) with additionalvari-
ables to capture the spirit of the "preferred habitat"model have, on the
whole, been unsuccessful. Indeed, empirical support for the existence of
time—varying term premiums is largely confined to structural models of the
long—term bond market, such as those estimated for the United Statesby6
Friedman(1977, 1979) and for Canada by Masson (1978).In these models,
demand functions for long—term bonds areestimated for each major class
of investor, such as banks, life insurance companiesand so forth. When
the aggregate of these demands is set equal to supply,the models yield
a (restricted) reduced—form equationfor the long—term rate. Although
these reduced—form equations contain asset stocks,financial flows and
other variables associated with time—varying term premiums,the repeated
failure of researchers to find comparable effectsin the traditional term
structure equations is rather disconcerting. Clearly,the careful and
successful inclusion of stock and flow variables into demandand supply
functions is not sufficient to guarantee that the implicit equationfor
the long—term interest rate will better characterize its evolutionthan
will the traditional term structure alternatives. Transactors exogenous
to the model —suchas investment dealers —mayinclude Meiselman's risk—
neutral, well—financed speculators whose arbitrage activities atthe margin
impose the expectations solution on the term structure. Indeed,the
succésfu1performance of these models lii thiaxante forecasting experi—
thent relative to the martingale alterrative ouid offer perhaps the most
imressive supportfor their successful incorporation oftime—vrying
tépreiniuiii.(SucheXPerimefltS couldbe cOnducted by extracting the
impl{ed for the long—term intetest rate and then using otimal
titheerieS prCdictors oi the variabiésèxogenoti to the model to create
the e ante forecasts.) As yet, no such vdEnce has been offeredin
supportofthese models.10onclude,noone hasyetprbduced convincing
evdflècf thO existenc Of wellde1ineated ad prediätable timeVaying
termpremiums sufficient tO salvage on anpriori besi&the "forecast—7
ability" of short—run movements in long—term interest rates on these
grounds.
Finally, the preceding discussion has implicitly assumed that agents
do not have access to inside information. Following Lucas (1976), there
also exists considerable doubt as to whether agents who mightpossess
inside information —suchas central banks —cansuccessfully forecast
movements in long—term interest rates. For central banks, the forecasting
exercise typically consists of the attempt to simulate the impact on long—
term rates of contemplated policy initiatives. There exists the fundamental
concern that standard simulation exercises may not provide the central
bank with reliable "forecasts" of movements in long—term rates conditional
upon hypothetical changes in policy instruments. If such policy initiatives
diverge from those which characterize the period over which the policy—
maker's macroeconometric models have been estimated, or alter the time
series properties of key variables (such as the short—term rate) which
drive expectations, then little faith can be attached to the implicit
assumption that the underlying structure of the economy will remain invari-
ant to the contemplated activity. In short, even agents with access to
inside information may have difficulty in forecasting short—term move—
ments in long—term interest rates, a result which provides a re—inforcing
perspective on the negative conclusion regarding the "forecastability"
of such movements contained in the prior discussion.8
3. THE MARTINGALE APPROXIMATION: SOMEEMPIRICALEVIDENCE
Let Hnt denote the holding—period return on long—term bonds
in period t, c1 the (known) coupon to be paid during the period t,
the price of the bond at the end of period t and tl the informa-





Ifthe bond is trading at par, so that is simply the long—term
interest rate R,t_i then (4) can be written
E(PI )—P
E(H I)=ttl t—1+ R (5) n,t t—l Pt—1 n,t—l
Let ipbe the constant term premium accorded the n—period bond. Assuming
that investors have a one—period horizon, and noting that Rl,t_l is the
ex ante return on holding one—period bonds, the relationship between the
ex ante returns on short— and long—term securities canbewritten as
follows:
E(PI 1)—P1
Rl,tl + tn =E(HIi)
= + Rn,t_i (6)
Implicit in (6) is the ex ante change in the long—term interest
rate necessary to equilibrate the two returns, up to the presumed time—
invariant term premium. Let xrepresentthe expected capital gain or
loss implied by (6), or (R1,_i + —Rntl)•
Since the price of a9
consol is just the coupon divided by the interest rate, theax ante change
in the long—term rate if the bond were a consol (tRA) issimply:
tRA = (7) 1 + x ,t—l
If the long—term bond is trading at par, and if its term tomaturity of
n—periods is sufficiently large so that its change during the period can
be ignored, then the larger change in the long—term ratenecessary to
produce the same capital gain or loss is approximately:4
=tR * 1
(8) n,t co,t — 1
(l+Rn,t_l)tl
Note, in general, that the unitofobservation is crucial to the
determination of and hence ARA .Forquarterly data, for
example, the interest rates in (6) are expressed as quarterly rates,
and the implicit capital gain or loss is only one—fourth of thatrequired
in the case of annual data. The smaller the unit of observation, cet.
thesmaller is the required capital gain or loss and hence the smaller
the ax ante change (expressed at an annual rate) in the long—term interest
rate. Since economists traditionally forecast macroeconomic variables
on a quarterly basis, the unit of observation will be standardized at one
quarter in the subsequent analysis.
Matching data on 90—day Treasury bills with long—term Government
of Canada bonds, and 90—day finance companypaper with long—term corporate
bonds,5 the ax ante changes in thelong—term rates canbecalculated in two steps10
using (7) and (8).6 A representative term to maturity of 17 years was
deemed to be appropriate for both of the long—term bond indexes. The
time—invariant term premiums in (6) were set equal to the average spreads
between the corresponding long— and short—term rates during the sample
period 1957:1 —1979:1.These premiums equalled 136 basis points for
Canadabonds, and13,8 basis points for corporate bonds.
Theresultsof these calculations, summarized in Table 1, indicate
that the ex ante changes in the long—term rates are indeed quite small.
The mean absolute change is only 2.07 basis pints for Government of
Canada bonds, and 2.60 basis points for corporate bonds.7 The maximum
changes were 7.21 and 9.67 basis points, respectively. A full eighty—
eight percent of the cx ante changes for Canada bonds were smaller than
4 basis points in absolute value. The corresponding figure for corporate
bonds was 80%. By contrast, the actual changes in these long—term rates
were typically quite large. Of particular interest is the striking differ-
ence inthe size of the variances of the cx ante changes and the variances
of the actual changes. The ratio of the former to the latter equalled
0.62%for Canada bonds and 1.26% for corporate bonds. Since anticipated
and unanticipated changes in long—term rates must be uncorrelated if
the market is efficient, these figures imply that 99.38%and98.74% of the
variances of the observed changes in Canada and corporate bonds, respectively,
must be due —underthe joint hypothesis of market efficiency and time—
invariant term premiums —tothe receipt of new information. Equivalently,
under this joint hypothesis, regressions of the current change in the
long rate on any set of variables known at the beginning of the period11
are not likely to explain more than one percent or so of the variance of
the dependent variable. A higher R2 or explained variance would suggest
the presence of spurious correlation, and suggest that the observed relation-
ship is not likely to prove useful in an out—of—sample or forecasting con-
text.
To sum up, the ex ante changes in the long—term rates are so close
to zero that the no—change prediction of the martingale model is a very
close approximation to the optimal forecast under the joint hypothesis.
This benchmark is employed in the subsequent analysis of the recorded
forecasts of long—term interest rates in Canada.8 Note also that the small
size of these cx ante changes suggests that the relatively large changes
in long—term interest rates implicit in many recorded forecasts imply sub-
stantial variation in the cx ante return on long— relative to short—term
securities. This point receives attention in the subsequent discussion
of the recorded forecasts.
4.AN ANALYSIS OF RECORDED INTEREST RATE FORECASTS IN CANADA
The Conference Board in Canada has made quarterly macroeconomic fore-
casts since late 1974, and histories of these forecasts for long—term cor-
porate bonds (McLeod, Young, Weir (MYW) 10 industrials) and 90—day finance
paper are available. Data Resources Incorporated (DRI) of Canada has pub-
lished macroeconomic forecasts since 1974, and historical data are avail-
able on five separate interest rate series: 90—day Treasury bills, 90—day
finance company paper, long—term Government of Canada bonds, long—term cor-
porate bonds (MYW 10 industrials) and long—term provincial bonds (MYW 10
provincials). For a large part of the sample period, DRI forecasts are
available monthly. To provide comparability with the other recorded forecasts,12
only four forecasts per year —correspondingto the calendar quarters —
wereemployed in the forecasting experiments. Since December of 1974,
McLeod, Young, Weir and Company Limited has conducted quarterly surveys
of interest rate forecasts, receiving responses from 35 to 40 individuals
from the financial community. The survey respondents are asked to pro-
vide one and two quarter ahead forecasts of nine Canadian and three U.S.
interest rates. Since (1) the concern in this paper is with Canadian data
and (2) several of the series (such as the prime lending rate of the char-
tered banks) are not determined in auction markets, only three series
proved appropriate for this study: 90—day finance company paper, long—
term corporate bonds (MYW 10 industrials) and long—term provincial bonds
(MYW 10 provincials).
In comparing the recorded forecasts to the predictions of the mar—
tingale model, care must be made to ensure that the martingale forecasts
(i.e. the current value of the relevant interest rate) do not have access
to information not available at the time the recorded forecasts were made.
Since the published data on the several interest rates series are available
only on a monthly basis, the martingale forecasts were set equal to the
interest rate at the end of the latest month which unambiguously preceded
the month in which the recorded forecasts were made. In so doing, this
procedure confers an informational advantage to the recorded forecasts.
This advantage typically consisted of about two weeks, but in some cases
approached a full month.
The results of the forecast comparisons,9 summarized in Table 2,
indicate that the recorded forecasts of long—term rates in general failed13
to outperform the no—change prediction of the martingale model, while this
was not the case for the recorded forecasts of short—term rates. In view
of the theoretical discussion, this result is not surprising. Only the
two—quarter ahead forecasts by DRI of the long—term Canada rate proved
superior to the martingale forecasts.Even this modest success merits
qualification, however, in view of (1) the informational advantage accorded
the recorded forecasts and (2) the inferior performance of the one—quarter
ahead forecasts relative to those of the martingale model. This latter
result suggests that the improvement of the two—quarter ahead forecasts may
be somewhat of a statistical artifact and not likely to obtain over a
longer sample period.
Both the DRI and MYW survey forecasts of the short—term rates did
prove significantly superior to the martingale model. Further, the forecasts
of the short—term rate by the Conference Board were about as accurate as
the martingale model, while their forecasts of the long—term rate were
distinctly inferior. These results, in general, enhance the credibility of
the null results with respect to the forecasts of the long—term rates.
In general, there always remains —especiallywith survey data —theposs-
ibility that the reported figures do not accurately reflect the expecta-
tions that actually drive market behavior. In this regard, it is interesting to
note that Friedman (forthcoming) provides evidence that the Goldsmith—Nagan
interestrate forecasts fail to pass a now standard battery of tests designed
tomeasure their "rationalityt'. Asnoted by Pesando (19751,), such failures
raisethe interpretive question of whether the recorded forecasts do indeed
reflect those of active economic agents, in which case the latter fail to14
form "rational" expectations, or whether such recorded forecasts must
not be those of the market on the maintained hypothesis that the market
efficientlyprocessesinformation. Lynch (1979) performs this stan-
dard battery of tests —theunbiasedness of the forecasts, the orthogon—
ality of forecast errors to costlessly available information, and effi-
ciency and consistency in the use of autoregressive information —onthe
MYW survey data and, on the whole, the results are favourable to the hypo-
thesis that the expectations are rationally formed.
Finally, the magnitude of the changes in the long—term interest
rates implicit in many of the recorded forecasts merits comment. The
maximum (absolute) change forecast for the corporate bond rate, based on
the two—period compared to the one—period prediction (so as to eliminate
theuncertainty regarding the date —andhence the value of this rate —
whenthe forecasts were made), equalled 22 basis points in the MYWsurvey
data, 30 basis points for the DRI forecasts and 70 basis points (!)forthe
Conference Board forecasts. The mean absolute changes were 11.2, 12.7 and
13.8 basis points, respectively. In view of the magnitude of the ax ante
changessummarized in Table 1, theserecorded forecasts clearly imply
substantialvariation in the ax ante return on long— relative to short—
term securities. For the extreme forecast of the Conference Board, for
example,the implied ex ante return on long—term bonds is 32.60%. During
this same quarter, the Conference Board was predicting a 6.86%returnon
90—dayfinance company paper. On a:prima fade basis, this result appears
to be unreasonable and serves to highlight the conceptual importance of
translating predicted changes in long—term rates into comparable statements15
about their ex ante holding—period return. Although corresponding
calculations for the DRI and MYW survey forecasts are less dramatic,
they also imply a very sharp divergence between the ex ante returns
on short— and long—term securities.10 Both forecasters and those who
monitor forecasts would be well advised to focus on ex ante returns
in assessing the likely path of long—term interest rates during their
forecast horizons.
5. SUMMARYAND CONCLUSIONS
The failure of the recorded forecasts of long—term interest rates
to outperform the no—change prediction of the martingale, and the reversal
of this result for short—term rates, is not surprising on theoretical
grounds. In fact, however, this point does not appear to be well under-
stood by many financial market participants. These results, for example,
mirror those found in two studies of the accuracy of recorded forecasts
in the United States. The authors of these studies, however, apparently
failed to fully understand the nature of their findings. Prell (1973),
analyzing Goldsmith—Nagan survey data for the period 1969:3 —1972:4,
found that the recorded forecasts of short—term rates (Federal funds,
90—day Eurodollars and 90—day Treasury bills) outperformed the no—change
prediction, while those of the long—term rates (Aaa utility bonds) did
not. A similar, although less precise, analysis by Fraser (1977) of pooled
forecasts of the National Association of Business Economists, Wharton
Econometric Forecasting Associates and Chase Econometrics, Inc. for the
period 1974—1976 suggests comparable results. In both studies, the authors16
refer with some surprise to the inability of forecasters to outperform
the"naiv&' no—change extrapolation for long—term rates, and apparently
fail toanticipate that their results are not surprising in light of the
evidence in support of market efficiency.
To conclude, economic agents ought to regard published forecasts
of short—term movements in long—term interest rates with a healthy degree
of skepticism, although the same does not necessarily apply to future move-
ments in short—term rates. (The very small ex ante changes in long—term
rates isolated for the quarterly data examined in this paper do not, of
course, necessarily imply trivial future movements in the short—term rate.
In the absence of yield data on noncoupon bonds with sequential maturity
dates, however, such implied movements are not easily extracted.) Those
seeking to forecast movements in long—term rates over longer horizons
ought to explore further the use of the ex ante changes in the long—term
rate implicit in the term structure itself as a means of refining the
no—change prediction of the martingale model. In this regard, the large
forecast changes in long—term rates in the recorded data analyzed in this
paper —whichimply substantial ex ante variation in the returns to long—
term relative to short—term bonds —meritnote. These results highlight,
in the absence of convincing evidence regarding the existence of time—
varying term premiums, the fact that economic agents ought to observe
two rules: (1) predicted changes in long—term rates must be "small",
at least over short forecast intervals, if they are to be creditable; and
(2) predicted changes in long—term rates ought to be recast into statements
regarding ex ante returns on long—term bonds, in part to facilitate com-
parison with the ex ante returns (i.e. the interest rate) on short—term
securities.17
Footnotes
If stock prices follow a random walk (i.e. P — = where
is an independent and identically distributed disturbance term with mean
zero), then equilibrium returns are zero. If stock prices follow a random
walk with a particular form of drift (i.e. P ——1
=+kPi), then
equilibrium returns are constant (and equal to k). The statement in the
text is meant to draw attention to the fact that forecasts of the future
level of common stocks which translate into large (in absolute value)
ex ante returns on a diversified portfolio are appropriately discounted
by the market. The same skepticism does not seem to apply to forecasts of
changes in long—term interest rates, perhaps because the latter are not
so easily translated into statements about ex ante returns and/or the case
for market efficiency is viewed as less persuasive for bonds than for
common stocks.
2
The standard errors of the regressions, in basis points, for the Trea-
sury bill andfinancecompànypaper rates were: ARMA(1,1),74.92 and
92.90; AR (2), 75.98 and 93.65; AR (1), 78.32 and 94.08. In the AR (1)
regression, the null hypothesis that the coefficient of the lagged rate
is equal to one could not be rejected. The standard errors for the martin—
gale or ARIMA (0,1,0) models, which constrain this coefficient to equal
unity, are clearly larger than those noted for the AR (1) specification.
See, for example, Roll (1971) and McCallum (1975).18
4 dP—dR
Equation (8) is derived as follows. For a consol, =
R
Since
the ex ante changes in the long—term rate implied by (6) are so small, this
expression produces ex ante changes (dRc, =*Rco,t_l =_Xt
*
R,_1)
which are almost identical to the exact changes implied by (7). Consider
the standard valuation formula for an n—period coupon bond. Let c be
the coupon payment and F be the face value of the bond. After summation,
the standard valuation formula reduces to:
(F —
(Fl) R(l+R)'
Differentiating (Fl) and dividing the resulting expression by price yields:
C
____ n(t) ___ - nF + + dR
(1+R )n+1 (l+R )n+1 (1+R )n
n












Hence, for a given (= x),thelarger change in the interest rate on
an n—period bond is related to the change in the interest rate on a consol
by (8). Note, of course, that dRn + dR, as n +19
The corporate bond series is the McLeod, Young, Weir 10 Industrials,com-
piled by McLeod, Young, Weir and Company Limited. The other series are
compiled by the Bank of Canada. The corporate bond rates are those pre-
vailing on the last business day in the quarter. All of the other rates
are those prevailing on the last Wednesday in the quarter.
6
Calculating the ex ante change in the long—term rate as if the long—term
rate were a consol provides a useful check on the results reported in the
text. If these changes are not trivial, then the larger (in absolute
value) changes for the finite maturity bonds clearly cannot be trivial either.
The mean absolute values of the ex ante changes so calculated are 1.42
and 1.92 basis points for the government and corporate bonds, respectively.
For corporate bonds, the term to maturity figure of 17 years is clouded.
by the existence of call options and sinking funds. Fortunately, the
results of the simulation exercises are not sensitive to moderate changes
in the assumed term to maturity of the bond indexes. For an assumed term
to maturity, of 10 years, the mean absolute value of the ex ante changes
is 3.57 basis points rather than the 2.60 basis points reported in the
text. For an assumed term to maturity of 20 years, the corresponding figure
is 2.44 basis points.
Similarly, variations in the assumed value of the time—invariant
term premium do not produce major changes in the mean absolute values of
these ex ante changes. If, contrary to most empirical studies, the term
premium is set equal to zero (i.e. the pure expectations hypothesis is
assumed), then these values rise to 3.50 and 4.02 basis points for Canada
and corporate bonds, respectively. These higher values reflect the tendency20
of long—term to exceed short—term rates, which thus requires —onaverage —
oxante increases in long—term rates to produce the capital losses necessary
to equilibrate ex ante returns.
8An obvious question is whether the use of the ex ante change to refine
A
the martingale prediction (i.e. =
Rn,t_l
+ AR rather than
R =R )willimprove its forecasting accuracy and thus provide a
n,t n,t—l
more useful benchmark. In fact, root—mean—squared errors of the refined
martingale as defined above were slightly smaller than that of the martin—
gale model for the period 1957:2 —1979:1.These errors equalled 34.87
and 29.75 basis points for government and corporate bonds, respectively.
compared to those of 35.15 and 30.81 basis points for the unadjusted
martingale model. These results, in general, invited the estimation of
the following regression:
AR =a+ B(ARA )+ (F4)
n,t n,t t
Underthe joint hypothesis of market efficiency and a time—invariant
term premium, a =0and B =1while the residuals are devoid of serial
correlation. The appropriate test statistic for the null hypothesis
(a =0,B =1),distributed F(2,86), equalled 0.83 and 2.97 for govern-
ment and corporate bonds, respectively. The 5 per cent significance level
for this test statistic is 3.12 and thus the null hypothesis could not
be rejected for either of the two data sets. The Durbin—Watson statistics,
as required by the joint hypothesis, provided no evidence of serial correla-
tion. Finally, as anticipated in the text, the explanatory power of these
equations is quite low. R2 equalled .022 in the corporate bond regression,
and only .005 in the government regression.21
The forecasts differ in their release dates, and pertain to both quar-
terlyaverage (Data Resources and the Conference Board) and end—of—the—
quarter (MYW surveys) interest rates. As a result, the accuracy of the
forecasts cannot be compared across forecasting agents.
10
The maximum change predicted by DRI implied an ex ante return on long—
termbondsof 17.71percent at a time when DRI forecast a 9.49percent
returnon finance company paper. For the MYW survey, the corresponding
figures are 17.23 per cent and 9.29 per cent.22
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CUMULATIVE FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF ABSOLUTE VALUES OF
INLONGTERNINTEREST RATES
ANTICIPATED CHANGES
In both tables all numbers are in basis points.
the calculation of the anticipated changes.
See text for discussion of
Mean absolutechange 26.38 2.07 23.08 2.60
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